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The two and a half years Dewey lived in Japan and China offered him an East-West comparative 
standpoint to examine Euro-American presuppositions. In subsequent work he took steps in the 
direction of a global philosophical outlook by promoting a fusion of aesthetic refinements with 
democratic experimentalism. 2021 marks the centennial of Dewey’s return to the United States, 
yet philosophers in this country have only begun to take in an emerging global philosophical 
scene that includes unfamiliar questions, angles, idioms, and emphases. In a sense, as Gregory 
Pappas has observed in the context of American philosophies, pragmatism did not “grow up” in 
the United States. As a coherent philosophy it originated there, and it is now growing up through 
critical and mutually transformative intra-cultural dialogue (Pappas; cf. Behuniak).  
As pragmatism continues growing up, we can bear Thoreau’s words in mind: “I know of 
few radicals as yet who are radical enough.” He was implying, in an implicit jab at Emerson, that 
the radicals of his day did not dig deep enough, down to the level of their conceptual roots, to 
inspect them in order to transform their own lives (qtd Walls 168-169). Thoreau expressed this 
radicalism through “an iconic work of performance art” (Walls 194) in 1845-47, living on the 
shore of Walden Pond. Like Thoreau, in American Philosophy in Translation Naoko Saito digs 
deep, exposing the originating roots of pragmatism to criticism “with the result that its identity is 
translated” to meet contemporary conditions (Saito 72). 
Approaching philosophy as translation for grown-ups, and Stanley Cavell as “American 
philosophy’s translator” (72), Saito insightfully and incisively explores anxieties of inclusion, 
which are “experienced when we have to live with dissent and are exposed to discordant, 
disturbing voices” (Saito, Two-Way). Building on Cavell’s reflections on the experience of 
untranslatability, she argues that contemporary conditions urgently require us to go beyond a 
politics of inclusion that stops at recognizing and respecting diverse values. Such a politics is too 
self-centered and monological, she avers, so it leads to educational experiments in low 
expectations. To get beyond a simplistic cosmopolitanism in our political education, she argues 
that we require the mutual destabilization and transformation that can arise through the difficult 
experience of standing on and crossing incommensurable linguistic borders.  
We need broad, interdisciplinary political education for bidirectional internationalization, 
Saito urges, and such a hopeful education requires teachers and students to learn to live with 
“discordant elements of human lives” by preparing and inhabiting a “space of disequilibrium” 
(122). The direct experience of linguistic translation can help us to inhabit this space, but she 
primarily uses translation as a metonymy: “With the processes of self-criticism it so readily 
instills, translation is a metonym of such transformative experience” (Saito, Two-Way). 
Translation is a metonym for the way we can open a non-assimilative communicative field, 
however uneasy or frictional (cf. Medina), that can help to disclose and co-create common 
ground so that we are more likely to achieve what Isaiah Berlin’s called the “uneasy 
equilibrium” of democratic discourse (In Gray). 
Saito’s project speaks to our urgent need to create intra-cultural, cultural, and subcultural 
contexts in which we become, in Eddie Glaude’s words, “the kind of people that a democracy 
requires” (personal communication; see Glaude). Glaude was talking about racial habits and the 
racial value gap in the United States, but Saito’s more general analysis is pertinent. Consider, for 
instance, the controverted meaning of “inclusion” at historically white American universities and 
liberal arts colleges. Many black and Latinx students, Glaude observes, feel small and 
insignificant at these institutions and end up not flourishing. This is in part because some 
students are too often “included” in a one-directional assimilative way, on the terms of those 
holding caste-like positions of social dominance. Saito’s analysis implies that insofar as we fail 
in our political education to create a mutually unsettling context for bidirectional transformation, 
we fail all of our students. 
In my role as a discussant, I now frame some questions and issues in the hope that one or 
more may elicit further inquiry: 
1. Saito argues for “the renewal of language education” that includes an 
awareness “that different languages open different possibilities of thought, and that all 
languages have their limitations, such that the exposure to other languages can be 
enlightening” (124). This is an educational aim that cannot be met by sophisticated 
translation software. Meanwhile, language education in the United States is increasingly 
weakened by ongoing program cuts, exposing students to less and less that is dissonant 
across linguistic borders (136). Given current budgetary constraints, does Saito prescribe 
this as the most important area for faculty hires and curriculum development? 
2. On Garrison’s reading (this volume), Saito’s Cavellian skepticism begins 
with an inward autonomy that must encounter the Levinasian Other in an asymmetrical 
relationship. Does Saito hold that such a view is more receptive to marginalized voices 
than the transactive Deweyan view that Garrison advances?  
3. Saito emphasizes the receptive aesthetic dimension of Dewey’s 
philosophy that is not oriented around active problem solving. Her critical remarks are 
mostly reserved for the dimension of his philosophy that is oriented toward mediating 
problematic situations. This latter dimension risks complicity in hegemonic economic 
calculations. Is there a hint here of Heidegger’s critique of overreaching “calculative” 
philosophies, which he (mistakenly) applied to classical American pragmatism? As 
evidenced by her timely theme, Saito embraces a philosophic turn that speaks to living, 
including the struggle to meet widely shared problems. Perhaps Saito could further 
clarify why she argues that a suitably contextualized conception of inquiry into problems 
falls short of her anti-foundationalist perfectionism. 
4. Saito references Dewey’s purported inability to acknowledge the “residual 
unknown” (104), and she wonders whether Dewey’s “robust pragmatist antiskepticism” 
would “be hospitable enough, resourceful enough, to accommodate the anxious voices of 
those on the margins of society, to hear what has been left unexpressed, and to be open to 
the unknown?” (72). As Glaude, Shannon Sullivan, and many others have highlighted, 
Dewey was not in fact resourceful enough, and he certainly did not always personally 
exemplify his deeply democratic outlook. Nevertheless, Saito’s philosophical outlook 
appears to be akin to Dewey’s own in their shared emphasis on democratic processes and 
social learning. Dewey’s work with Jane Addams at Hull House in Chicago in the 1890s 
underscored for him the ever-growing happiness to be found, he said, “simply in this 
broadening of intellectual curiosity and sympathy in all the concerns of life” (LW 5:422). 
Lacking any perfected ideal standpoint, in Dewey’s view more can and should be done to 
democratically minimize the way in which unconsulted and unheard concerns and 
tensions are illegitimately overlooked, hidden, or relegated as moral externalities. At a 
conscious philosophical level, he understood that conduct that is progressive in one focal 
dimension of a situation is often simultaneously regressive with respect to marginalized 
concerns that are off-the-radar of any in-group's idealizations. Perhaps Saito could further 
clarify what she sees as Dewey’s philosophical shortcomings here. Is she revealing roots 
of Dewey’s philosophy that may have stunted the practical development of his deeply 
democratic outlook? 
5. Saito highlights limitations of what Richard Bernstein has called Dewey’s 
“rooted cosmopolitanism” (72). Might one live up to Saito’s ideal of an artful translator 
while nevertheless being a rootless cosmopolitan? Speaking as someone who thinks 
cosmopolitanism must become more deeply rooted in nature and culture, I do not think 
we can count ourselves successful as educators if our students become consummate 
crossers of unstable border regions at the price of rootlessness. Nor does Saito, but this 
concern about rootlessness presents an opportunity for further clarification: To what 
extent does Saito see the art of rooted bidirectionality as a worthy ideal to perfect?  
6. Saito argues in Chapters Four and Five that translation is an interlinguistic 
art as well as an intralinguistic one. Vincent Colapietro (this volume) invites us to look 
beyond prototypical linguistic translation toward what Roman Jakobson conceived as 
intersemiotic translation. Accepting Colapietro’s invitation, let me return to Thoreau to 
thicken my critical concerns about rootlessness. Through his “investiture” as an 
intersemiotic translator across the human-nature border, Thoreau calls out to those whose 
own daily lives express a contact-less, assymetrical relation to nature. Contact with nature 
was for him the way beyond maladjusted desperation, quiet or otherwise. Aldo Leopold 
expressed as much in A Sand County Almanac, in a timely entry for our March 
conference:   
A March morning is only as drab as he who walks in it without a glance skyward, 
ear cocked for the geese. I once knew an educated lady, banded by Phi Beta 
Kappa, who told me that she had never heard or seen the geese that twice a year 
proclaim the revolving seasons to her well-insulated roof. Is education possibly a 
process of trading awareness for things of lesser worth? The goose who trades his 
is soon a pile of feathers. (Leopold)  
Dewey was no Leopoldian naturalist, but his rooted sense of our cultural 
inhabitation of nature carried Thoreau’s torch, freed from the 19th century 
transcendentalist tendency to overly romanticize nature and to echo assumptions of a 
providential natural order. We exist, and our lives are imbued with meaning, by grace of 
infinite natural relations that precede us and are affected by us (LW 9:14-18). I do not 
read Saito as advocating the education of cosmopolitans uprooted from nature. After all, 
the bidirectional perfectionist translator starts from her home ground, not from a placeless 
point. But her critique of Dewey’s rooted cosmopolitanism could be clarified to explore 
whether Cavellian an-archic perfectionist education—steeped in “perfection with a strong 
sense of imperfection” (121-122)—can help students and their teachers relate to the 
natural world in a more meaningful, value-rich, and ethically appropriate way. 
7. What, if any, is the role of empathy within Cavell’s and Saito’s 
perfectionist striving? Based on Saito’s descriptions, it seems that the best translations 
rely on empathetic imagination. Likewise, the art of teaching as translation appears to 
involve great empathy. For example, in the current lingo, teachers must imaginatively 
take up the standpoint of novices who lack the competence to be aware of their relative 
incompetence. 
8. In his reading of Saito and Thoreau, Colapietro (this volume) agrees that 
the anxieties of inclusion are real and pressing, but he suggests that it is investiture—
avoiding the “inner death” of an unlived life (within an infrastructure of unsustainable 
and hollowing consumption)—that is the “controlling question of the perfectionist 
project.” What might be noticed, or missed, by entertaining with Colapietro that the issue 
of how to invest our lives, rather than the anxieties of inclusion, should be at the heart of 
Saito’s call for bidirectional transformation? 
9. In his reading of Saito and Dewey, Garrison (this volume) highlights 
Saito’s assertion that Dewey’s philosophy is inadequate to “being affected by what is 
beyond our grasp” (72). Garrison points to “Qualitative Thought,” an essay Saito 
references (33). Dewey wrote: “The gist of the matter is that the immediate existence of 
quality, and of dominant and pervasive quality, is the background, the point of departure, 
and the regulative principle of all thinking” (LW 5:262). Dewey elaborated the felt 
horizon of experience as a pervasive, “underlying qualitative character that constitutes a 
situation.” All meaning, whether linguistic or affective, is dependent upon this qualitative 
field, which suffuses and differentiates experience (LW 5:248). Does reading Dewey 
primarily through this affective prism, as Garrison prescribes, imply any reframing of 
Saito’s critique? 
10. On a closely related note, it is sometimes said, quite rightly, that art is 
ineffable. Hence, as an art, the meaning of a translation exceeds what can be expressed 
through language. But from Dewey’s standpoint, this is not because the art of translation 
outstrips thought. Thought is itself qualitatively nuanced. Thought requires “language, 
the tool of tools,” but thought is not identical to or reducible to language (LW 1:134; see 
LW 1:132–61). Dewey was not suddenly, despite his professed naturalism, positing some 
gaseous extralinguistic “thought” here. His view was thoroughly naturalistic, as he 
clarified in “Qualitative Thought”: “Language fails not because thought fails, but because 
no verbal symbols can do justice to the fullness and richness of thought” (LW 5:250). 
What are implications, for philosophy as translation, of Dewey’s contention that thought 
is more qualitatively nuanced than language?  
11. Finally, looking beyond translation as a metonymy, is direct experience of 
inter- and intra-linguistic translation necessary for bidirectional internationalization? Is it 
on its own sufficient? In other words, what Saito calls “the very moment of crossing 
borders” is a vital experience for weaving an intra-cultural identity, but is it moreover 
“necessary to learn to live” in this way (75, my emphasis)? Arguably, what is minimally 
necessary for furthering cross-cultural understanding, Kwame Anthony Appiah has 
argued in tandem with dual-process psychologists like Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan 
Haidt, is something noncognitive, namely for people to get used to each other so that 
their driving intuitions change (Appiah 2010; Haidt 2012). Take early objectors to same-
sex unions in the United States. Many soon got over this, but most of them were not 
opening themselves anxiously to the untranslatable. They just got used to a new normal. 
Their habituated intuitions changed along with the new baseline. A deeper Saito-esque 
transformational encounter would presumably be far more durable, and would be a 
resource for dealing with the anxieties of inclusion in other life situations. These are vital 
aims of education, and Saito’s book is the best argument I have yet encountered for 
teaching the art of translation across the curriculum. Nevertheless, even as we struggle to 
open more educational opportunities for mutually transformative translation, we can still 
contribute to a wider cultural context in which people get used to each other in ways that 




Citations of John Dewey’s works are to the thirty-seven-volume critical edition published by 
Southern Illinois University Press under the editorship of Jo Ann Boydston. In-text citations give 
the original publication date and series abbreviation, followed by volume number and page 
number. For example, (1934, LW 10:12) is page 12 of Art as Experience, which was published 
as volume 10 of The Later Works.   
Series abbreviations for The Collected Works:   
EW The Early Works (1882–1898)  
MW The Middle Works (1899–1924)  
LW The Later Works (1925–1953)  
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